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EDITOR'S NOTE 
Dr. Virgil Hurlburt finished the first draft of th is publication in 
October , 1962. After a long illness he died on November 30, 1962. 
I was asked by the North Central Land T enure R esearch Committee 
to carry the work on this manuscript forward to completion . 
R epresen ting his last work, this publication is a fitting monument 
to Dr. Hurlburt's memory, and his tireless efforts in the field of land 
tenure research. His humor, perseverance, and productivity will be 
long missed by his m any associates. 
Howard W . Ottoson 
Foreword 
In J 952 the North Central Land Tenure R esearch Committee 
(NCR-6) created a subcommittee to work on the topic "Effects of 
Alternative Tenure Arrangements on the Use and Productivi ty of 
Farm Resources." In part, interest in this topic was stimulated by 
questions raised in earlier work of the Farm Tenancy Subcommittee of 
NCR-6 on farm rental problems and practices. 
T he work of the new subcommittee occurred in two stages. The 
first stage, based on data from Iowa and Illino is which had been col-
lected as part of another study, dealt primarily with research tech-
n iques. It was reported in North Central Regional Publication No. 84.1 
The second stage of the work involved the testing of several hypo-
theses concerning the influence of tenure arrangements on en ter-
prise organization and the allocation of resources. The a nalyses were 
empirically based on an interstate study area located in southwestern 
Iowa, northeastern Ka nsas, northwestern Missouri, and southeastern 
Nebraska. The work was carried on under a cooperative agreement 
between the experiment stations of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and 
N ebraska, and the Economic Research Service of the USDA. For con-
venience, the field su rvey was made by personnel of the four states 
independently in 1957, after a common random sample had been 
drawn. The analysis was also divided among the four states and the 
ERS, with each making use of data from the four-state area. Iowa 
concentrated on the effect of tenure arrangements on resource produc-
tivity and farm efficiency; Kansas dealt with the effect of ten ure arrange-
ments on improvements to land and build ings; Missouri analyzed the 
relationship between tenure arrangements and size of farm; while 
Nebraska worked on the effects of tenure arrangements on short-run 
resource allocation. T he ERS u ndertook an an alysis of returns-cost 
ra tios and income transfers between parties to leases, as well as 
1 Walte r G. Mille r , Walter E . Ch ryst, and Howard W. Ottoson. R elative Efficien-
cies of Farm T enure Classes in l ntrafirm Resource A /location. North Central 
R egional Publ ication No. 84. Iowa Agr icul tural Experiment Station Bulletin 461. 
1958. 
2 
assuming responsibility for coordination of the work and integration 
of the results into a regional report. This publication reports the 
more significant findings in the four states. 
Members of the subcommittee on Alternative Tenure Arrange-
ments, during the time it was active, and the cooperating agencies, 
included: 
John Timmons 
Wilfred Pine 
Frank Miller 
Howard Ottoson 
Walter Chryst 
Walter Miller 
Virgil Hurlburt 
Gene Wunderlich 
D. Gale Johnson 
Joseph Ackerman 
Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station 
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station 
Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station 
ERS, U. S. Department of Agriculture 
ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
ERS, U. S. Department of Agriculture 
University of Chicago 
Farm Foundation 
Sydney Staniforth from the University of ·wisconsin and Philip 
Raup from the University of Minnesota also were consulted on phases 
of the study. 
Other publications resulting from this study include: 
Walter G. Miller. Comparative Efficiency of Farm T enure Classes 
in Combination of R esources. USDA, Agricultural Economics Research. 
January, 1959. 
Paul W. Barkley and Wilfred H. Pine. Effects of Farm T enure on 
Farm Improvem ents. Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 
No. 454. June, 1963. 
Dorwin Williams and Frank Miller. Land T enure Arrangem ents in 
R elation to Scale of Farming Operations and R esource Use in the 
Marshall Soil Areas of Northw est Missouri and Adjoining States. 
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 809. 
July, 1962. 
Duane Neuman and Howard W. Ottoson. T enure T ype, Organiza-
tion and R esource Use on Farms in Southeastern N ebraska. Agricul-
tural Economics Report No. 32. Nebraska Agricultural Experiment 
Station. 1964. 
Howard W. Ottoson, Walter G. Miller, and Murray Cormack. 
Research Bulletin in Process. Nebraska Agricultural Experiment 
Station . 
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Use of Farm Resources As Conditioned by 
Tenure Arrangements 
By Virgil L. Hurlburt2 
3 
I. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY 
How do tenure arrangements affect organization and use of 
resources within farm firms? Do lease terms and arrangements affect 
quantities and kinds of inputs? Does the tenant and the landlord each 
receive full earnings of the resources he contributes to the farm busi-
ness? Which of the strictly tenure-oriented characteristics of farms, as 
contrasted with the general economic problems of all farms, help to 
explain differences between and within owner-operated (00), crop-
share cash tenant-operated (CSC) and livestock-share tenant-operated 
(LS) farms? These are the major questions to which answers were 
sought in the research reported here. 
Miller, Chryst, and Ottoson found few significant differences 
between tenure classes in efficiencies of resource use.4 
It has been shown that the types of resource adjustment needed to 
approach optimum production levels vary to some extent according to 
tenure status. But it was suggested also that part of the differences observed 
in marginal returns could arise from the nature of the estimating equations 
as well as from biases in the values on which land inputs were based. Fur-
thermore, when the differentials in age distribution between tenure classes 
were taken into account, the levels of significance of the differences observed 
were reduced considerably. The extent of deviations from the optimum 
resource combinations under each tenure class appears to be unimportant 
because the average reductions in cost, especially percentage wise, are "small" 
and do not differ significantly between the tenure classes. These observations 
then introduce the possibility that either no real economic problems exist 
for the broad tenure classes or the methods used are inadequate for detecting 
the inefficiencies present. On the one hand, it could be argued that the 
differences are hidden by the aggregative nature of the analytical model. 
On the other, one might say that within the broad tenure classes the hetero-
geneity of tenure arrangements could have cancelled the inefficiencies (if any) 
present. Therefore, both facets of the problem require further inquiry. (p. 334) 
The present study was designed to deal with both inter and intra 
tenure differences through analysis of data from a sample of farms in 
2 Resource Development Economics Division, ERS, USDA, Ames, Iowa. 
3 Editors note: The comments of members of the North Central Land Tenure 
Research Committee, particularly those of Peter Domer, E. B. Hill, Frank Miller, 
and Franklin Reiss are acknowledged, as are those of Gene vVunderlich. 
4 \ Valter G. Miller, Walter E. Chryst and Howard W. Ottoson. Relative Efficien-
cies of Farm Tenure Classes in Intrafirm Resources Allocation. North Central 
Regional Publication 84. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Sta tion Bulletin 461. 1958. 
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a selected geographic area, selected so as to limit heterogeneity, and 
to provide opportunity for specific comparisons of selected facets. 5 
II. EFFECT OF TENURE ON RESOURCE COMBINATIONS AND 
FACTOR USES. 
Are the differences between tenures cancelled by the heterogeneity 
of arrangements within tenures6 in the usual forms of aggregative 
analysis? Present findings support an affirmative answer. But there 
is also evidence that efficiency in resource use is a function of the 
general problems of firm organization and operation, as well as of 
specific tenure arrangements. Particularly, differences between tenures 
tend to disappear when variables such as total capital are equal between 
groups of farms. 
Size of Business 
LS farms, as a group, were larger than CSC farms and CSC farms 
were larger than the 00 farms in the sample. This was the situation 
whether size is measured in acres per farm, cropland acres, total 
annual inputs, or value of production. The fact of difference in size 
raises the question of whether farms are larger because they are 
tenant-operated, or are tenant-operated because they are larger. 
Capital availability and interests of the two parties influence the 
choice of lease type on rented farms; with the amounts of capital 
usually controlled by individuals, two parties can form a larger business 
than one party alone, particularly under a LS lease. But some farms 
operated under CSC leases and by OOs were as large as the largest LS 
farm in the sample. There is nothing inherent in the lease type itself 
that requires a larger size of business for the LS arrangement than 
for other leases. But a larger business may be encouraged by the fact 
of sharing in costs and returns of livestock enterprises as well as of 
crops. 
When farms in each tenure group were d ivided into class intervals 
of total annual inputs, the proportion of livestock farms falling into 
the lower total annual input categories was lower than either 00 
or CSC farms. The proportion of farms in the lower categories was 
similar for CSC and 00 farms (Table 1). For example, only 52 per-
cent of the LS farms had annual inputs under $15,000 while this per-
centage was 69 and 75, respectively, for 00 and CSC farms. The pro-
portion of LS farms having annual inputs of $30,000 and over (17 
percent) was significantly greater than the small proportion (3 per-
cent) of CSC farms falling into this category. 
5 Details on sampling procedure, size of sample, and survey procedures are 
given in Appendix A. 
0 Miller, Chryst, and Ottoson. Op. Cit. p. 334. 
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Table I. Percent Distribution of Farms Within Tenure Group, by Total Annual 
Input per Farm
Tenure type and number of farms 
Annual I I All inputs 00 csc LS farms ( 1956) (157) ( 167) (104) (428) 
(Dollars) (Percent ) 
Below 
5,000 8*LS5 4 l *CSC5 4 
5- 9,999 37*LS1 36 l S*CSC I 32 
10-14,999 24*CSC5 35 33*00 5 31 
15-19,999 12 9 15 12 
20-24,999 9 11 10 10 
25-29,999 3 2 6 3 
30,000 
and over 7 3*Ll 17 8 
All 100 100 100 100 
• Significant differences in proportions, between tenures; LS refers to livestock share, CSC 
to crop share, and 00 to owner-operator; digit following the letters is the probability level. 
a Crop inputs is the sum of (1) fixed cost (inventory value of land and crop buildings at 
6 percent, minus rental value of rotation and perma nent pasture; depreciation and interest 
on inventory value of crop machinery at 26 percent; depreciation on value of crop buildings 
at 5 percent; operator and fami ly labor at $40.00 per week; ) plus the variable costs (fertilizer, 
seed, li me, seed treatment, custom work hired, crop building repairs, h ired crop labor, tractor 
fuel, oi l, grease, mach inery and truck repair, crop electricity, and other m iscellaneous expenses). 
Property taxes, insurance, and interest on borrowed fund s are excluded. 
Li vestock inputs is the sum of (I) fixed costs; 6 percent of average inventory value o f 
livestock, average inventory value of feed; and of inventory val ue of li vestock buildings; depre-
ciation o n l ivestock buildings at 5 percent; depreciation and interest on livestock machinery 
and eq uipment at 26 percent; operator and family labor on li vestock at ·40.00 per week; rental 
value of rotation and permanent pasture; plus (2 ) variable costs: farm produced feed fed, 
total livestock bought; veterinary and breeding fees, l i,,estock building repairs, li vestock fuel , 
oil and m achinery and truck repair, livestock electricity, total commercial feeds fed , hired 
livestock labor. and miscellaneous. 
W hen crop and livestock expenses are summed for the firm the value of farm feed fed 
is subtracted from the total, to remove the duplication. 
Total acres per farm differed between tenures but the d ifferences 
disappeared when farms were sorted by total input per farm. 00 farms 
(204 acres) were smaller than both the CSC (237 acres) and LS farms 
(280 acres) (Table 2).7 But the difference in to tal acres between CSC 
(247 acres) and LS (284 acres) was not significant for farms with 
$10-15,000 annual input (Table 3). T he difference in farm acreage 
between tenures was not significant at the 5 percent level of probability 
for farms with .$ 15-30,000 annual input. H owever, we recognized that 
the number of observations is sma ll and the standards of signi ficant 
high. 
T here were also fewer significant d ifferences in average crop 
acres per farm when inputs were held equal b etween tenu res (Table 
3). The fact of fewer significant differences between selected items for 
tenure groups when total input was held equal between tenures 
suggests the hypothesis that some of the problems of farm organiza-
t ion and operation are capital-oriented. 
7 Dorwin Williams and Frank Miller. Land T enure A rrangemen ts in Relation 
lo Scale of Farming Operations and R esource Use in the Marshall Soils Areas of 
Northwest Missouri ancl Adjoining States. Missouri Agricultural Experimen t Station . 
Research Bulletin 809. July, 1962. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Selected Mean Values of Size, Output, Capital and Income 
for Different Tenures
Tenure type All 
llem 00 csc LS farms 
Total acres, farm" 204 237 280 235 
Acres cropland" 140 188 203 174 
Total PMWU accomplished• 227 276 360 293 
Gross farm output, $0 11,324 12,162 17,374 13,504 
Total capital investment, S• 55,076 61,414 81,177 63,803 
Operators' net worth, $d 27,659 15,796 16,333 21,639 
Net farm income, $0 5,627 6,561 9,650 6,956 
• R ecombined from Missouri analyses as reported in Darwin Williams Scale of Farming 
Operations and R esource Use Under Alternative Land Tenure Arrangements. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Missouri, 1962. 
11 Significantly different at I percent probability level. 
b 00 versus CSC, and versus LS differ significantly at I percent level of probability. 
c 00 versus LS share, and CS versus LS differ significantly at I percent level of probability. 
d 00 differ from CSC and from LS at I percent level, and CSC differ from LS at 5 percent 
level of probability. All tests of difference by value o[ t. 
Statistical note : The significance levels in this table and others in this publication cannot 
properly be viewed col1ectively to make any judgment on "pooled" or overall differences between 
groups, since two or more individual characteristics may have common components of variance. 
Therefore, significance levels must be evaluated independently for each characteristic for which 
differences between means are tested. 
The distribu tion of operators b y age, within class intervals of 
total annual input, demonstrates that the smaller businesses are oper-
ated by older m en (Table 4a). Farms with inputs under $10,000 were 
skewed toward older operators, whereas in the $15-30,000 input group 
of farms nearly equal percentages fell in each age group. In the 
$10-15,000 group of farms there were more operators under 40 than 
for these with less than $10,000 input. T his results partly from the fact 
that OOs tend to h ave smaller farms than do tenants (Table 5). 
For these comparisons of age distribution, tenants older than 54 
were excluded because OOs over 54 were excluded in the sampling 
process. This was done to reduce the effects of age (and consequently 
family cycle) on other variables. 
Tables I to 5 indicate that tenant operators manage larger busi-
nesses than do OOs, younger operators are tenants more frequently 
than they are owners, and the age distribution of tenants is skewed 
toward younger operators. These differences cannot be attributed to 
the effect of kinship; closely related tenant-landlord firms were excluded 
from the sample to remove the confounding affect of family relation-
ships on other variables. 
OOs were employed off-farm more frequently than were tenants 
(Table 6), and the operators of smaller farms h ad income from 
off-farm work more frequently than did operators of large farms-with 
size m easured in total annual input. Also, of the OOs with less than 
$ 10,000 of annual inputs a larger percentage had incomes of more 
than $1,000 per year from off-farm work than did OOs of large farms 
or tenant operators. 
The tendency of OOs of small farms to seek off-farm work, while 
tenants increase their incomes by operating larger farm businesses is 
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Table 3. Comparison of Selected Mean Input and Output Values for Different Tenures, and Two Levels of Total Annual Input. 
Farms wilh $ 10,000-$ 14,999 Farms with $15,000-$30,000 
total annual input total annua l input 
Tenure type Tenure type 
Item 00 i csc I LS 00 I csc I LS 
Number of cases 
Total annual input ($) 12,185 12,526 12,582 19,964 20,037 20,834 
Gross returns ($) 14,240 13,7 18 15,072 18,938 21,954 22,795**00 
Total feed fed (.$) 5,787*CSC 4,106*LS 5,643*CSC 9,767**CSC 7,742 8,496 
Machinery investment ($) 6,117*LS 6,314*LS 4,245 9,324 8,980 7,401 *"00 
r:;:, Land and building value ($) 40,540*CSC 49,207 48,765**00 55,411 **CSC 67,033**LS 63,928 
Land and building/acre ($) 207 207 190 219 236 238 
Value all labor ($) 2,474 2,537 2,572 3,087 3,137 2,987 
Value crop production ($) 7,292*CSC 8,933 7,642**00 10,277**CSC l 3,105 11 ,496 
Livestock returns ($) 9,048*CSC 5,477 7,463*00 10,384 9, l 18 9,543 
Tenant returns ($) 9,549 8,038 15,992 11 ,859 
Landlord returns ($) 4,168 7,034 5,962 10,937 
Tenan t expense ($) 9,243 7,093 15 ,431 l l .2 10 
Landlord expense ($) 3,283 5,489 4,606 9,625 
Acres, farm 205*CSC 247 284*00 278 295 292 
Acres, cropland 150*CSC 192**LS 165 *00 184*CSC 248 223*CSC 
'* Differs at J percent level of probabi lity from 00 == owner operators, CSC :=crop-share tenant, LS = livestock-share tenant farms. 
Significant differences between groups, by t tesl. 
*'"' Differs at 5 percent level of probabi l ity. 
Table 4a. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Age Group, by Levels of 
Annual Input. 
I U nder. 10,000 S Total a nnu al input p er farm. Age 10,000- 15,00U- 30,000 (years) 14,999 ' 129,999 and over • All 
(percent) (percent) (perce nt) (perce nt) (percent) 
Under 30 22 50 19 9 100 
30- 34 32 35 20 13 100 
35-39 20 40 29 11 100 
40-44 31 28 30 11 100 
45-49 40 28 24 8 JOO 
50- 54 48 23 27 2 100 
Average 34 31 26 9 100 
• One or more significant difference in percen tages between age groups a t 5 percent level 
of probability. 
T able 4b. Percent Distribution of Operators in Input Interval, by Age Groups. 
S T ota l annu al inp ut p er farm 
U nder 10,000 I 10,000- 15,000- 30,000 + Age 14,999 29,000 Average 
(percc :--: ! ) 
Under 30* 5 14 6 9 8 
30--34 15 17 12 24 16 
35- 39* 8 18 16 18 14 
40-44 18 17 24 24 20 
45-49 24 18 20 18 21 
50-54 * 30 16 22 7 21 
All JOO JOO 100 100 100 
• One or more significant differences between percentages of age group in different intervals 
of tota l input. 
Table 5a. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Tenure, by Age Groups. 
Ten ure type 
Age LS csc 00 Average 
Under 30* 2 10 
(percent) 
16 8 
30-34* 5 25 20 16 
35-39* 8 24 12 14 
40-44* 19 14 30 20 
45-49* 31 14 12 21 
50--54* 35 13 JO 21 
Ali 100 100 100 100 
• One or more signi fi cant d ifferences in percentages, between tenures, a t 5 percent level 
of probability. 
Table 5b. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Age Group, by Tenure. 
Tenure type 
00 csc LS All 
Age . . . 
Under 30 9 44 
(percent ) 
47 100 
30-34 13 55 32 100 
35-39 22 58 20 100 
40-44 39 24 37 100 
45-49 62 24 14 100 
50--54 67 21 12 100 
Average 41 35 24 100 
• O ne or more significant differences between age grou ps, at 5 percent level. 
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an important finding. However it must also be noted that the sampling 
process in the study excluded part-owners; undoubtedly in the area 
studied there were many instances of owners who increased their size 
of business by renting land. This omiss ion does not imply a lack of 
importance of this tenure arrangement; it was simply felt that part-
owners could not be adequately treated within the limits of this study. 
There were no significant differences between CSC and LS tenants 
as to amount and frequency of off-farm work, bu t the CSC operators 
with less than $10,000 input in their farm businesses worked off farm 
more frequently than did those with business of $15,000 or more 
annual input. This difference was significant at the 1 percent level 
of probability. 8 
Expenditures for fertil izer on cropland were the same per farm 
for operators under different tenures within the same interval of total 
input per year, but differed between levels of total annual input 
(Table 7). This suggests that 00s follow the same cropping practices 
as do tenants, but that resource combinations change as total in puts 
increase. 
Investments in Improvements 
Significantly larger investments were made on 00 farms than on 
tenant operated ones in the sample for dwellings and service buildings 
during the period 1953- 1957. There were no significant differences 
between tenures as to fences, terraces and waterways, legumes or pas-
ture improvements (Table 8). 
Apparently, there are greater opportunities or incent ives for invest-
ment in buildings on 00 farms-where the operator pays the costs 
and receives the benefits-than on tenant operated ones, on which there 
are problems resulting from length of occupancy and cost-return 
sharing. This does not imply that effective arrangements can not be 
developed for improvements on tenant operated farms . R ather, cus-
tomary rental arrangements do not encourage them. In the individual 
Table 6. Percent Distribution of Operators With No Work Off the Farm, W ith 
Less Than $1,000 Off-Farm Income and With More Than $1,000 Income From 
Work Off Farm, by Tenure and by Total Annual Inputs per Fann. 
Percent of operators by intervals of incom e from o ff -farm work 
Owner operators I Crop-share-cas h I L ivestock share 
Annual I Under 1 O ver capital None I Under I Over None I Under \ Over Non e 
input a $1,000 1 $1,000 a $1,000 SI ,ooo s 1.ooo ls 1,ooo 
Under $10,000 51 18 
(percent) 
31 75 13 12 85 15 0 
$10- 14,999 79 ]! 10 83 12 5 74 20 6 
$ !5- 29,999 89 ll 0 98 0 2 87 3 JO 
Over $30,000 82 0 18 100 0 0 95 0 5 
All 69*CSC 13 18 84*00 9 7 84*00 10 6 
a One or more sign ifi ca nt difference at 1 percent level of probability between intervals
"' Own ers differ from tenants at 1 percnt leve l of probability . 
8 Additional discussion of this point is found in Williams and Miller Op Cit . 
JO 
Table 7. Percent Distribution of Farms by Dollars Ferti lizer on Cropland, by Tenure and by Total Annual Input per Farm. 
Total ,rnnual inputs, dollars 
I 
Under $ 10,000 $ 10- 14,999 I $ 15-29,999 $30,000+ 
Amount 
spent on Tenure type and number of farms 
fertilizer, 
I I I I I per 00 csc LS 00 csc LS 00 csc LS 00 csc (18) farm (72) (65) (20) (38) (59) (35) (36) (38) (31) (11) (5) LS 
None* 71 71 70 
(percent) 
47 44 37 31 34 42 45 60 17 
.$300 or Jess* 23 21 25 32 34 46 36 24 35 28 0 22 
$301-$1,000* 6 8 5 21 22 17 33 32 23 18 40 50 
More than $1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JO 0 9 0 11 
'* One or more significant difference in percentages between input intervals, J percen t level of probability. 
T able 8. Average Expenditure During 1953 to 1957 on Improvements by T enure 
Class." 
0 0 I csc LS 
No . No. I Average N o. I Average Improvements farms Average farms farms 
Dwelling househ 139 $1090 109 $ 469 52 $ 805 
Service bu ildings• 139 1141 109 426 52 757 
Fences 138 365 109 352 51 565 
Terraces and waterways 138 395 106 291 53 391 
Legumes 139 474 111 455 54 507 
Pasture 138 117 111 28 54 17 
Drai nage" 139 142 106 11 5 54 209 
Total improvemen ts• 136 3704 97 2100 48 3026 
Non-dwelling• 136 2617 99 1658 49 2400 
Dwelling and service 
bu ildings• 139 2230 206 916 51 1592 
Land imp rovements 136 1111 101 876 50 11 32 
Total expenses 
acre• 136 20 97 9 48 11 
a Average for totals or aggregates are for only those cases reporti ng all items included 
in the tota l or aggregate . 
b Means significan tly differen t at the 5 percent level of probability. 
• Means sign ifica ntly different at the I percent level of probability. 
d Includes m iscellaneous expenditures on improvements. 
Source: Pau l W . Barkley and Wilfred H. Pine. Effects of T enu re on Farm I mprovemen ts. 
Ka nsas Agricultural Experimen t Station, Bulletin No. 454 , 1963. 
case, improvements made by either the owner or the tenant opera ted 
farm may depend on capital ava ilabi lity. Bu t the pooled resources of 
landlord and tenant do not necessarily exceed those of an 00. Fur-
thermore, monetary returns from improvements to buildings are no t 
as direct or possibly as favorab le as are those from other inputs in 
the same firm. In housing particularly, the investmen t resul ts in sa tis-
faction for the occupant, but may not affect the gross farm returns. 
T he analysis of improvements also included the effects of cos t-
sharing arrangements, compensa tion provisions, length of lease, con-
tinua tion clauses, and provisions for removal of improvemen ts a t 
term ination, to ascer tain whether these terms of leases influenced the 
level of improvement expenditures. The mos t impressive finding was 
the general lack of specific arrangements to deal with improvemen ts 
on ren ted farms. R ela tively few leases had provisions on these item . 
T he interview did not inqui re into the further detail as to whether 
separate and additional negotia tion provided the basis of decision on 
improvement expendi tures; the compar isons were made on the basis 
of whether there were such provisions in the lease. Also, the com-
parisons were made within lease types rather than between tenures. 
Average expenditures per farm for the selected types of improve-
ments seldom differed signi ficantly, regardless of the presence or lack 
of a provision for them in the lease. Mean expendi tures for drainage 
were larger (at 1 percent level of probabili ty) when the landlord su p-
plied materials and the tenant did the work than for farms with no 
sharing arrangements. Also, improvements to terraces and waterways 
were larger for farms with cost-sharing arrangemen ts than for those 
12 
with none. There were no significant differences in, improvements asso-
ciated with the presence of compensation provisions. Only six percent 
of the crop-share leases and nine percent of livestock share leases 
had them. 
Expenditures on dwellings and fences were larger for farms with 
continuation clauses in the lease than for those without such clauses. 
But there were no significant differences in expenditures for improve-
ments on rented farms as influenced by provisions for removal of 
improvements, length of lease, written or oral leases, acreage in farm, 
farm income, income from off-farm employment, or the financial con-
dition of the farm as reflected by the ratio between assets and liabilities. 
Several of these findings are contrary to what would reasonably be 
expected. Presumably, expenditures for improvements would be larger 
when costs were shared or when other provisions affecting the inci-
dence of costs or benefits for improvements were included. Possibly the 
presence or absence of a provision in the lease is not an adequate bas is 
of comparison. The details might be negotiated by the two parties 
as an addition to and separate from the fact of the original agreement. 
lmput Combinations 
Comparisons between 00, CSC, and LS farms showed significant 
differences between these groups as to average inputs of crop acres, ma-
chinery investment, r eal estate value, and feed fed (Tables 2-3). They 
also differed as to fertilizer on corn, variable crop inputs per culti-
vated acre, percentage of cropland in forage, distribution of types of 
livestock, and expenditures for improvements. These differences sug-
gest that inputs are not allocated the same on farms of different tenure 
types. But evidence is lacking that the tenure form is responsible for 
the differences; further, differences in allocation of inputs does not 
necessarily imply a difference in efficiency in the use of resources. 
Analysis of variance was used to test for differences between tenures 
as to intensity of crop production, measured in dollars worth of com-
mercial fertilizer used per acre on corn, and total variable crop expense 
per cultivated acre. Significantly less fertilizer was used on corn acres 
on LS farms ($2.95 per acre) than on 00 farms ($4.07 per acre) or 
on CSC leased farms ($4.37 per acre).9 OOs had significantly higher 
variable inputs per cultivated acre ($14.53) than did LS farms ($ 11.66) 
or CSC farms ($10.27). Also, OOs had a significantly larger percentage 
9 But livestock share farms had the highest corn yield per acre-52 bushels, 
which differs at the 5 percent level of probabibility from average yield for OOs at 
46 bushels, but not from crop-share tenants at 49 bushels. 
Source: Darwin Williams Unpublished data, Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics. University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri. 
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(28.7) of seeded acres in forage crops than did the other tenures-23.7 
for LS and 17.8 for CSC.10 (All differences significant at 1 percent.) 
Levels of inputs differed between farms within tenure groups. 
Some of the differences are tenure-oriented, but others are not. The 
analysis of input use within tenure categories is given below. 
Owner-Operators 
Neither intensity of cropping practice nor intensity of livestock 
production were affected significantly by the variations in financial 
positions of OOs. Multiple linear regression of fertilizer per acre of 
corn (as a measure of cropping intensity) on cash and securities owned, 
per crop acre, liabilities per crop acre (with real estate excluded), and 
percentage of real estate encumbrance resulted in a coefficient of 
determination of .06. That is, these variables explain only a nominal 
portion of the variation in use of fertilizer on corn. Likewise, mul-
tiple linear regression of total variable expenses per cultiva ted acre 
(as another measure of intensity of cropping) on the same variables 
shows that only .04 of the variation in expenditures per crop acre 
are explained by these measures of fin ancial position. 
Similar regressions for the value of commercial feed fed per animal 
unit, and of total variable livestock expenses per animal unit, both 
used as measures of livestock intensity, which were run on the same 
measures of financial position explained only about 1 percent of the 
variations in these inputs between farms. Additional analysis by regres-
sion gave results that showed only a small portion of the variation in 
percentage of investment in major livestock enterprises was expla ined 
by cash assets and liabil ities of OOs. These findings were in terms of 
groups of farms. It does not follow, of course, that an individual farm 
is unaffected by lack of capital or by over-encumbrance.11 
Crop-share Cash Farms 
Analysis of the effects of differential shares of product and of shares 
of cost vs. shares of return is made difficult by the differences in sharing 
between crops. Shares of all products are seldom the same; the pre-
vailing tendency is for the share of corn to differ from the share of 
oats; cash rent is usually paid on pasture and frequently on hay. 
Several va riable costs, such as tractor fuel, are seldom shared, but 
nearly all returns are shared. Thus, there are too few leases wi th 
equal product shares, or with the share of each variable cost equal 
to the share of product to which it contributes, for careful comparison 
for equal sharing vs. differential sharing. 
10 Murray Corm ack. The Effects of Alternative Tenure A rrangements on I n tra-
temporal R esource Allocations ancl Enterprise Selection . Unpubl ished Master 's 
Thesis. University of Nebraska, 1960. 
11 I bicl. . 
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A linear regression of dollars per acre of variable crop costs on 
percentage of total variable crop expense paid by the landlord gave 
a coefficient of determination indicating that 61 percent of the variat ion 
in total variable crop expense per acre is explained by variation in 
percentage of crop costs paid by the landlord. Tests of differences in 
percentages of cultivated acres in row crops, and in percentage of total 
variable crop expense per cultivated acre, between farms with equal 
shares vs. those with different shares of all crops showed little evidence 
of significant difference (i.e., a significant difference at a probability 
level of 10 percent). Analysis of variance for differences in percentages 
of cultivated acres in row crops depending on whether tenant or land-
lord made the decision on acreages of crops, and likewise for differences 
between total dollars of variable crop expenses per acre when one or 
the other party made the decision, showed no significant differences.12 
Cobb-Douglas production functions were computed for two groups 
of farms-those sharing crop products alike and those with differential 
shares within farms . Farms were paired between groups, to hold total 
annual value of inputs approximately equal and thus to remove the 
probable effect of differences in quantities of inputs. As a check, the 
value of crop production (dependent) was regressed on crop acres, 
weeks of crop labor, crop machine services, and miscellaneous crop 
expenses. T h ere were no significant differences between the two groups 
at the 5 and 10 percent level of probability.13 
Few tenants expressed belief that differential sharing affected crop 
combinations, and the tests used found no significant differences. 
Differential sharing apparently is not an important determinant of 
croppng pattern. 
Comparable functions for crop production were also computed for 
both CSC and LS leases, with division within tenure made on the basis 
of equal or different share of total value of selected items of expense 
vs. share of crop return. This basis of grouping was the only feas ibl e 
one, because few farms met the full condition of sharing all variable 
expenses and sharing them in the same proportion as returns. There 
were no significant differences between farms with like and with unlike 
sharing at the 5 or 10 percent level of probability. 
Livestock-share Leases 
Linear regression and analysis of variance were used to test for 
differences within LS leases. A linear regression of value of total vari-
able crop expenses per acre cu ltivated on percentage of total crop 
expense paid by the landlord indicated that about 12 percent of the 
var iation in variable crop costs is explained by variation in percentage 
12 Ib id . 
1 3 John Timoth y Sanderson , R elative Efficiency of A lternative Ten ure Arrange-
ments, U npublished Master of Science Thesis, Iowa State University, 1960. See 
Appendix B for detail on Cobb-Douglas model. 
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of costs paid by the landlord. Analysis of var iance was used to test fo r 
differences in type of livestock ra ised on farms (1) where the landlord 
made the decision on livestock type, (2) those where the tenant made 
the choice, and (3) both made this decision jointly. The percentage 
of animal units in feeder cattle was significantly higher (at 5 percen t 
level of probability) when the landlord made the decision than when 
tenants did, but no further test was made to determine the effect of 
capital availability on choice of type of livestock. In short, resource 
combinations on LS farms are essentially the same whether product 
shares are the same or different, whether or not shares of cost are the 
same as shares of returns, and whether selected management decisions 
are made by either party or jointly.14 
It may well be noted, however, that differential sharing is a cus-
tomary practice which m ay be accepted without question because it 
is customary. Further, differential sharing of returns is accompanied 
by differential sharing of expenses, and the cost sharing may offset 
the effect in returns sharing. From the several limitations in the data 
available, as well as from the strong logical base in theory to the effect 
that differential sharing will cause either transfers in income between 
parties or departures from optimum combination of inputs, the results 
of this study leave room for doubt as to actual effect of differential 
sharing in current leases. 
Value of Land and Buildings 
Although average value of land and buildings per acre varied 
little for the three tenures- OOs, $195 ; CSC, $203; LS, $214; and all 
farms $204-the distribution of farms by ranges in value per acre 
differed between groups. T here were more 00 farms in the lower value 
range. 15 Thus, 36 percent of OOs had farms valued at $150 or less per 
acre, compared with 24 percent for CSC and 17 percent for CSC and 
17 percent for LS farms (Table 9). 
Table 9. Percent Distribution of Farms by Value of Real Estate Per Acre, for 
Each Tenure Grou p. 
Tenure 
Value per acre 
per fa rn1 00 csc LS All farms 
(percent) (percent) (percent ) (percent ) 
$150 or less 36* 24* 17* 27 
$151-200 23* 34* 32 29 
$201-250 25 24 33 26 
$251-300 14 18 14 16 
$301-350 2 0 3 2 
$350+ 0 0 l 0 
All 100 100 100 100 
• Difference within value interval significa nt between tenures at 5 percent probability. 
u Murray Cormack, Op. Cit. 
15 Although owner-operated farms had larger expenditures on improvements 
than did tenant operated ones (Table 8) the difference was no t large enough to 
skew the distribution away from the low value interval. Also, buildings account for 
a sm aller portion of farm value than does land . 
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Value of la nd and buildings per acre did n ot differ between ten ures 
wh en farms were gro uped b y total capital inputs per year. But values 
per acre were higher for the farms in the $15,000-30,000 capital interval 
than for those in the $10,000-1 5,000 interval (Table 3) . 
Annual cost of real es tate (est ima ted h ere at 6 percent of value
repor ted by opera tors) as a percentage of to tal annual inputs did not 
differ be tween tenures, when fa rms were grouped by intervals of 
annual input. Nor did th e percentages differ significantly between 
intervals. For farm s within input intervals the percentages which lan d 
and building cost represented of total an nu al cost were: 
00 
csc 
LS 
$10,000-14,999 $15,000-30,000 
input 
20 
23 
23 
inpu t 
16 
20 
18 
R eal esta te is the largest item of cap ital inves tmen t on most 
farms. In special cases of in tens ive livestock operat ions, the li vestock 
input might exceed that of real estate, but then nearly the whole 
livestock input " turns over" a nnuall y. T he annu al cost of la nd a nd 
buildings is frequently exceeded by other inputs. 
Ill. INCOME EFFECTS OF TENURE ARRANGEMENTS 
T he preceding comparisons and ana lyses were in terms of se lected 
characteristi cs of farms or of operators, with the object ive of explor ing 
differences in size of business and input combinations. ALtention is 
now directed to the income effects of these and other differences 
between and within tenure groups. More specifically, do the differences
between combinations of factors result in differences in efficiency of 
resource use? Do reso urce owners receive the marginal value products 
of the resources they contr ibute to the farms they operate? The evi-
dence marshalled here suggests tha t current leas ing practices have I ittle 
effect on efficiency of resource use-00s and tenants follow the same 
farming practices-but there are income transfers between parties to 
some leases . 
Factor Productivity 
Production functio ns of the Cobb-Douglas type were used to Lest 
differences between groups of farms. Separate funct ions for crop 
a nd livestock were computed for fa rms in each ten ure group ancl for 
a ll farms in the sample, to remove the compo unding effect of crop-
livestock relations within firms. Marginal valu e products were esti-
1• See Appendix for detail of content and method. 
17 The elasticity of production of land is not a direct funct ion of th e pri ces of 
hogs or beef, as is assumed if crops and livestock are combined in one production 
function for the farm firm. Instead, the productivity of land is a funct ion of the
value of products from land and of tb e qualities and quantities of inputs combined 
with i t. 
17 
mated from the computed coefficients, and these were compared with 
thei r respective factor prices or opportunity costs. In general, the evi-
dence suggests that there is nothing in any of these tenure forms in 
pract ice that makes one superior to another in use of resources. 
There were few significant d ifferences between elasticities in either 
the crop or the livestock functions (Tables 10, 11 and 12). None of the 
elasticities for crop production differed between tenures at the 5 
percent level of probability; only those for livestock inventory and 
feeds fed d istinguished LS farms from CSC or 00 farms (Table 10).18 
The fact that the sums of the elast icities exceeded 1.00 in Tables J 0 
and 11 is indicative of slight ly increasing returns to scale in every case. 
T he pattern of margin al returns to resources used in livestock pro-
duction on LS farms differed from that of the other two ten ures. Mar-
ginal re tu rns to livestock inventory, livestock labor, and feeds feel for 
LS farms d iffe red from those of CSC and 00 farms at either the one 
or 5 percent leve l of probability Part of these differences may resul t 
from the larger q uan tit ies of resources used. Also,cl ifferences between 
selected mean values decrease when capita l inputs are held equal 
between tenures (Table 3). 
Comparisons of rat ios of marginal returns to opportunity cost of 
resources show h igh returns to crop-land in all three tenures a nd to 
lives tock inventory for 00 and CSC farms; returns to labor are low. 
Table JO. R egression Consta n ts, P rod uc tion E lasticit ies, Geom etric Means of 
P roduction Levels and R esource Inputs, and R elated Stat istics for Crop Esti-
m atin g Equ ation s for Each o f Three Tenure C lasses, and the T otal of All Farm s. 
Item I Symbol 00 csc LS 
Average production, 
.552 1 7803 ($) / farm (Y) 85 13 
Con stant (a) 12.1798 9.3028 8.5 104 
Average cropland (acr es) (X,) 120.8 173.0 182.9 
elasticity (b,) .905 1" .75..J.7:l .8433" 
Average crop Jahor (weeks) (X,) 28 .8 335 32.4 
elasticity (be) - .0044 .0172 .1245" 
Average crop 
machine services ($) (Xs) 1643 1887 2004 
clastic itv (b,) .2 185" .2-166" .1972" 
Average m iscella neo us crop 
cash expense ($) (X ,) 524 615 719 
e lastic ity (b ,) .0278 .1437" .0885< 
Sum of elasticities (~bi ) 1.1 470 1.1 622 1.2536 
Correlation index (R") .8367 .77 19 .8412 
1 S1g01ficantly d1ffc1cnt from zero .lt the J percent probability level. 
b S1gmficantlv d 1ffe1ent from zero at the 5 percent probability lc\"el. 
c S1gn1ficantly dtffcrent from zero at the JO percent probability level. 
All 
farms 
70 13 
10.3271 
153.6 
.829 1" 
31.4 
.0230 
1819 
.2125" 
602 
.1054' 
1.1699 
.8294 
All other b Yalucs uonsignih ca nt at pro babilit y levels of less than 40 percent. See Appendi x 
B for regression equation. 
Source: John T . Sanderson. Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arrange ments. Unpub-
li shed Master's Thesis. Iowa State University 1960 p. 5 1. 
" .J ohn T. Sanderson. Of>. Ci t. 
1
" John T. Sanderson. OfJ. Cit., p . 60. 
JS 
Table 11. Regression Constants, Production Elasticities, Geometric . Means of Pro-
duction Levels and Resource Inputs, and Related Statistics for the Livestock 
Estimating Equation for Each of Three T enure Classes, and the Total of 
All Farms. 
Item 
Symbol 00 csc LS 
Average production, 
(S) / farm (Y) 4633 3+93 8308 
Constant (a) 1.0405 1.45+ 1 2.2468 
Average livestock 
inventory ($) (X 1) 4640 39-10 870+ 
elasticity (b,) .4297" .4920" .1288 
(weeks) (X,) 22.3 22.1 28.9 
Average l ivestock labor 
e lasticity (b2) - .030+ .0243 .1780 
Average livestock bui ld ings 
and equipment (S) (X,) ,128+ 3770 4935 
C'lasticity (b3) - .0043 -.0999 -.1 l+l" 
Average feeds fed ($) (X,) 3826 2969 5989 
elasticity (b,) .5048" .42,j3" .905 1" 
Average miscellaneous 
livestock expense ($) (X ,) 394 378 615 
elasticity (b,.) .1 236° .1783" -.0706 
Sum of elasticities (~b,) 1.0234 1.0200 1.0272 
Correlation index (R 2) .7785 .8017 .6704 
:i Significantly diffe rent from zero at the I percent probability level. 
h Significan tly different from zero a t the 5 percen t p robab ility level. 
c Significantly different from zero at the JO percent p robability level. 
See Appendix B for regress io n equation. 
All 
farm s 
4778 
1.2554 
5069 
.4279" 
23.7 
.032 1 
42 17 
-.06-15° 
3862 
.5 173" 
432 
.1250" 
1.0378 
.7781 
Sou rce: John T. Sanderson . R e/alive Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arrnagements Unpub-
1ished Master's Thesis. Iowa State University I 960. p. 52. 
Table 12. Values o( t for D ifferences in Production Elastic it ies Between T enure 
Classes. 
Inpu t categories I 00 VS. csc 
CrufJ J1rudu clio11 elasticities 
Cropland 1.58 
Crop labor .3-1 
Crop mach ine services .3'[ 
Miscellaneous crop cash expense 1.95 ' 
Lives/ark production elasticities 
Livestock inventory .55 
Livestock labor .45 
Livestock bui ldings and equipment .99 
Feeds fed .6-1 
Miscellaneous livestock cash expense .51 
=
1 Significantly different al 1hc 1 percent probability level. 
b Significa ntly differen t at the 5 percent probability level. 
c Signi fica ntly different al the JO percen t probabi lity lcu:! I. 
00 \'S. LS 
.62 
1.75' 
9-,_ :, 
.85 
2.26" 
1.37 
1.26 
2.52" 
1.67° 
All o ther differences no nsignificant at p robabi lity levels of 20 percent or less. 
csc vs. LS 
.87 
1.35 
.57 
.91 
2.87" 
1.06 
.16 
3.19" 
1.93" 
b iJ-b ik \•\/here b i is the regression <:odfi c:cnt for the ith resource, j and k 
t== 51, - bik ar,e tenure classes, and the divisor is the sq uare roor. of t he sum of 
IJ ,·arianccs. 
Source: J o hn T. Sanderson. Relative Efficiency of . Alternative T enure Arrangements Unpub-
lished Master;s Thesis. Iowa State Un iversity. 1960. p. 56. 
Editor note: The above t test may not be consistent with the F test that wou ld result 
from 1hc application o( a likelihood ratio pri nciple. T his applies also to Table 13
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Table 13. Marginal Return / Opportunity Cost Ratios at the Geometric Means of 
R esources and Production £or Each Tenure Class
Jn p u t ca tegory 00 
Crop resources 
Cropland 2.84 
Crop labor -.02 
Crop machi ne services .73 
Miscellaneous crop 
Livestock resources 
expense .29 
Livestock inventor y 4.30 
Livestock labor - .1 6 
Lives tock buildings and equ ipment .00 
Feeds fed .61 
Miscellaneous lives tock ex pense 1.45 
a T he oppor tu n ity costs used were : 
S 14 .56 per acre for cropl and 
$40.00 per week for crop a nd li,·cstock labor 
10 percen t of li vestock in vent o r y 
J I percen t of li vestock b uild ings a nd eq ui p m en t. 
csc LS 
2.3-i 2.70 
.1 0 .82 
1.02 M 
J.82 1.05 
4.40 1.20 
.I O 1.28 
- .82 -1.73 
.50 1.26 
1.65 -.95 
Dollars expended for crop mach ine services, mi scell aneou s crop ex pense, feed s fed , and 
miscell a neous l ivestock expense. 
Source: Joh n T. Sanderson. Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arrangements. Unp ub-
l ished Ma ster's T h esis. Iowa State University. 1960. p. 62. 
T able 14. Va lues of t for Differences Between Marginal R eturns to Crop and Live-
stock Resources and the Resource Prices for Each T enure Class." 
In p u t category 
Crop resources 
Cropland 
Crop labor 
Crop machi ne servcies 
Miscell aneous crop expense 
Livestock resources 
Livestock inventory 
Livestock labor 
Livestock bui lding-s and equipm ent 
Feeds feel 
Miscellaneous livestock expense 
00 
8.78" 
5.42" 
1.37 
1.37 
3.81" 
2.42c 
1.54 
3.33" 
.58 
b Significantly different at the 1 percent probability le\'e l. 
c Significantly different at the 5 percent probabili1y level. 
d Significantly different at th e 10 percent probability level. 
csc 
6.18" 
3.13" 
.08 
1.95d 
5.01" 
2.86" 
3.09" 
5.24" 
.82 
LS 
6.97" 
.45 
.60 
.08 
.20 
1.01 
3.14" 
1.43 
1.50 
~'ft-Pi \Vherc .\Ii is Lh e marginal r eturn of the i th 1·esourcc at th e geometric 
mean, P i is the opportunity cost a nd Sm 1 is the square root of 1he 
va riance of th e marginal r e turn . 
t= 
Smi 
00 and CSC farms were limited in land and lives tock capital. Under 
LS leasing, marginal returns to labo r did not differ from its opportun i ty 
cost; only m arginal retu rns to crop-land and to li vestock buildings and 
equ ipment d iffe red from their opportuni ty costs (Tables 13 a nd 14).20 
The producti on funct ion analyses indicated that land is limiting 
in all three ten ures-bu t more so for 0 0s-and that LS tenants were 
relatively m ore efficien t in use of reso urces. 
Returns-Expense Ratios 
00 fi rms as a grou p h ad lower earning r atios per dollar of input 
th an did either of the leased firms as groups. When dollar value of 
20 See John T. Sanderson . Op Cit. pp. 128-130. 
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total returns per farm was divided by total input per farm, and the 
resulting ratios were averaged, leased farms had earning ratios higher 
than 00 farms (Table 15). But only the LS firms had significantly 
higher ratios (Table 16). 
The difference between ratios for 00s and for leased farms may 
arise from the combinations of inputs used or from combinations of 
products. But the differences between groups as to returns-expense 
ratios do not necessarily imply a difference in efficiency in use of 
resources. 
Table 15. Earning/ Expense Ratios for Firms, Operators, and Landlords by Tenure 
Class. 
Tenure class 
00 
csc 
LS 
Firm 
99.8 
107.4 
114.0 
Operator 
99.8 
100.6 
108.7 
See footnote to Table 1 for explanation of annual inputs and returns. 
Landlord 
134.0 
125.6 
Table 16. Results of Tests of Significance of Difference Between Earning Ratios.• 
Tenure group tested Value of Probability 
t Level 
00 vs. CSC firm .79 * 
00 vs. LS firm 3.34 .01 
CSC-tenant vs. LS-tenant firm .59 
Landlord vs. tenant:" 
CSC firms 2.42 .02 
LS firms .98 
" Landlord vs. firm" 
CSC firms 1.90 * 
LS firms 1.15 * 
a t == mea n I - mean 2 
square root of [pooled variance (111 + n 2) / 111 n 2] 
• not significant at 5 percent level of probabili ty 
b Editors note: lnsofar as joint var ian ce may exist between data for landlords, tenants, and 
firms, the validity of the t test as used here is open to question. 
Table 17. Earnings/ Expense R atios for Firms With $10,000 to $14,000 of Total 
Inputs and for Firms With $15,000 to $30,000 of Total Inputs by Tenure Groups.• 
Tenure g roups 
00 firms 
CSC firms 
Tenants' 
Landlords' 
LS firms 
Tenants' 
Landlords' 
$10,000 
to 
$14,999 
Total firm expense 
Average return per expense ratio 
Percen t 
117.8 
109.5 
103.9 
135.4 
119.7 
116.l 
130.1 
$ 15,000 
to 
$30,000 
95 .3 
108.l 
101.7 
135.l 
110.5 
107.7 
119.0 
a These ratios do not quite agree with values obtained by divid ing appropriate returns 
by expenses 1n Table 3 because these a re computed as a mean of the sum of r at ios for 
individua l fa rms in the group. 
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CSC landlords earned significantly more per dollar of input 
than did their tenants, but there was no significant difference between 
LS landlords and their tenants (Table 16). Nor did landlord ratios 
differ from firm ratios at the 5 percent level of probability. In terpreta-
tive comments on these results are given on pages 32 and 33. 
Earning ratios also differed between tenures when farms were 
sorted by intervals of total inputs (Table 17). But none of the differ-
ences within the $10- 14,999 capital interval were significant, except 
those for tenants vs. landlords in CSC leases (Table 18). The difference 
between OOs and LS tenant firms was significant a t the 5 percent 
level of probability for farms in the $15-30,000 input group, and the 
ratios for landlords were significantly larger than those for tenants 
only in the CSC firms. 
The lack of significant differences between landlords and tenants 
under LS leases warrants comment. The test of significance as such 
says that in repeated sampling, d ifference of the amounts found could 
be expected-that is, the difference is not large enough to exceed 
sampling varition. A more important question to a landlord and a 
tenant may be one of how large a percentage difference has meaning 
to them, if they are aware of differences. Any calculated d ifference of 
more than 1 percent might be grounds for dissatisfaction if they are 
aware of such a difference. 
Although there are few significant differences between tenures in 
the means of the return-expense ratios per farm and only the means 
for CSC farms differ between landlord and tenant, the dis tribution 
of rat ios within tenure groups do d iffer. The percentage of farms with 
ratios less than 1.0 was significantly larger for OOs than for both CSC 
and LS farms, and was also larger for CSC than for LS farms (Table 
19). Also, CSC tenants had ratios less than 1.0 more frequently than 
did their landlords, and more CSC than LS tenants h ad ra tios less 
than 1.0 (Table 19). LS tenants had ratios less than one more frequently 
Table 18. Results of Tests of Significance of Difference Between E arning Ratios, 
Between Tenure Groups, and Between Landlords and Tenants. 
Tenure groups tested 
00 vs. CSC firm s 
00 vs . LS firm s 
CSC-tenant vs. LS-tenant firm s 
Landlord vs. tenant 
CSC firms 
LS firms 
a Level of statistical sign ifi cance: 
10,000 
to 
$14,999 
1.102 
.2 19 
1.506 
-1.007" 
l.620 
b Significantly different at the l percent probability level. 
c Significantly different at the 5 percent probabilit y leve l. 
t=- mean 1 - mean 2 
Total firm inpu t 
Value of t a 
sq uare root of [pooled variance ( n 1 + 11 2) / 111 11 2] 
22 
$15,000 
to 
$30,000 
1.966 
2.237 ' 
.385 
3.352b 
1.381 
Table 19. Percentages of Farms, of Landlords, and of T enants With Returns-
Expense R a tios Less Than I.(), by T enure. 
Tenure 
00 firms 
CSC firms 
Landlord 
Tenan t 
LS firms 
Land lord 
Tenant 
Percent of fa rms with ratio below 1 
53" 
42b 
22 
57' 
27 
26 
40" 
a Larger than for CSC fi rm and landlord; LS fi rm, landlord, and tenant. 
b Larger than for LS firm; and landlord. 
c Larger Lhan for CSC landlord; and LS tenant. 
d Larger than for CSC landlord, and for LS firm and landlord. 
All d ifferences significant at I or 5 percent level of probabil ity. Test of difference in per-
centages from prepared tables, station circu lar No. 15 1, Washington Agricultural Experimen t 
Station , Pullman: June, 195 1; based on t test. 
than did the farm firms which they operated. These d ifferences in 
percentage of distribution of ratios within groups indicate that tenants 
earn less per dollar of their inputs than do their landlords. Apparently 
the wide range in ratios per farm, per operator, and per landlord in 
each group accounts for the lack of significant d ifferences in the means 
for the groups. 
T he estimated value of housing furnished the tenant and also the 
00 and lancllords' expenditures on repair and improvement of dwel-
ling are excl uded from these cos t-returns data. 
Income Transfers Between Parties to Leases 
U ndoubtedly, som e of the differences between earning ra tios for 
landlords and tenants result from the cost accounting used in this 
study. Land was charged as a cost to the firm by tak ing six percent 
of the estimated market value of the farm; and all estimates of land 
a nd building values were obtained from the operators. Any tendency 
to underestim ate land values would thus underestimate landlord cost 
and g ive landlords a higher returns expense ratio. But, as shown by 
Table 3, Janel values per acre d id not differ ver y much between ten-
ures. 00s reported much the same average values as did tenants. 
Also, labor costs were entered at a standardized $40 per week, but labor 
qualiLy undoubtedly varied between operators. Further, no account was 
taken of cost or quality of the management input, which in effect 
meant for this study that management was assumed as equal between 
farm s and tenures. 
Differences between earning ratios for landlords and tenants also 
arise from the terms of the lease-the shares, the i tems of expense 
and the produ cts shared, the input structure, and from the p aym ents 
made for inputs such as buildings and pasture in the production of 
products not shared. Yields and prices for the year 1957 might have 
influenced the amount of income or value of product to b e d ivided, 
but not the proportional sharing. From other studies it is known 
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that rental terms change slowly.21 Thus, the earning ra tios are not 
necessarily unique for the year 1957. 
All this suggests that the rental market was a landlord 's market in 
the study area. However, for the majority of tenan ts, this market may 
be a better economic opportunity than owning their own farms. The 
tenant under a CSC lease received a return of $1.006 per dollar of 
annual input, compared with the OO's $.998 (Table 15). Or the LS 
tenant received $1.087 per dollar of his input, compared with $1.149 
in the firm and $1.256 for the landlord. In terms of earning ratios, 
many tenants with their limited capital were better off than was the 
00. But why do tenant earning ratios differ from those of landlords 
or of the firm? At least part of the explanation rests in the arrange-
ments for sharing costs and returns. Shares differ within leases, as 
shown by the following discussions of the two lease types. 
Crop-share Cash Leases 
Shares of cost differ from shares of return. The landlord's share of 
crop returns exceeds his share of crop costs more frequent ly than h is 
share of costs exceeds his share of returns.22 Data from 167 CSC leases 
were tabulated in percentage points of difference from equality; tha t 
is, in selected intervals, percentage of return received by the landlord 
minus percentage of cost paid by the landlord. In 5 percent of the 
leases, shares were equal, and in an additional 36 percent they were 
within 5 percentage points of equal. But in nearly half of the leases, 
landlord returns exceeded his share of cost and in 12 percent h is share 
of costs exceed his share of returns by more than 5 percen tage points 
(Table 20). The share of fixed crop costs equaled the share of variable 
crop costs, which in turn equaled the share of returns fro m crops in 
Table 20. Distribution of Differences Between Landlord Shares o f Costs and 
Returns in CSC Leases. 
Difference N umber of cases N umber of cases Share of Share of 
betwee n where sh are of wh ere sha re of crop cost fi xed cost 
shares of r eturn exceeds cost exceeds vs. share vs. sha re 
costs and share o f cost , share of retu rn , crop varia bl e 
re turns for crops for crops retu rn s cost 
Perce nt (Percent of cases) 
+ + + or - + or -
0-5 19 17 41 6 
6-15 32 10 42 .. 11 
16-25 13 2 15 27 
26+ 2 2 56 
All 66· 29· 100 100 
a In 5 percen t o f leases shares were equ al. 
21 Walter E. Chrys t and John F. Timmons. A djusting Farm Rents to Changes in 
Prices, Costs, and Production . Iowa Agricultural Experimen t Sta tion . Special R eport 
No. 9, 1955. 
22 Th e costs referred to here include interest on in vestmen t and deprecia t ion 
on buildin gs cha rgeable to crop production , as well as cash costs. 
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one CSC lease. The share of total crop costs differed from share of 
total returns from crops by more than 5 percentage points in 49 percent 
of the leases, and shares of fixed cost differed from shares of variable 
cost in 94 percent of CSC leases (Table 20). T hus, fixed costs appar-
ently were balanced against variable costs to achieve equality of total 
costs and returns. Such balancing can be one of the causes of income 
transfers between parties, for dollar inputs in variable factors do not 
contribute the same to the earnings of the firm as do dollars input of 
fixed cost when the firm is not at its most profitable combination. 
Landlords pay some of the fixed costs in all CSC leases. (Fixed 
costs for livestock in this study includes a charge of 6 percent on the 
value of livestock buildings as well as depreciation on livestock build-
ings.) But the differences between shares of fixed and variable costs 
(Table 20) result from the customary practice of sharing selected costs 
at standardized fractional shares-usually 50 percent. In value terms, 
the fixed items supplied by the landlord do not equal those furnished 
by the tenant. Thus in many leases the shares of costs and returns 
differ between the two parties because fixed costs in the firm are shared 
on, say a 40-60 basis; all other shared costs may be divided in the 
standard 50-50 pattern. 
Livestock-share Leases 
The percentage shares of costs and returns for individual enter-
prises differed from those of total costs and returns in the firm (columns 
1, 5, and 8, T able 21). This is due to an apparent tendency for the 
two parties to arrive at their sharing arrangement by balancing differ-
ent enterprise shares to arrive at total shares; also, part of this comes 
about by the selection of specific items of costs which are shared. Costs 
of tractor fuel for crop and livestock operations, for example, are 
seldom shared. But most of the differences between landlords and 
tenants in their shares of total costs and returns result from differences 
in their shares of variable costs versus their shares of fixed costs. 
(columns 6 and 7, Table 21) . 
Only one LS lease had the same share throughout-with share of 
fixed cost of crops equal to share of variable costs of crops equal to 
share of fixed livestock equal to share of variable livestock equal to 
share of returns. 
The number and percentage of leases with the landlord's share of 
livestock returns greater than his share of livestock costs is approxi-
mately the same as those with share of livestock costs greater than 
share of total costs, and in turn greater than his share of the returns. 
Five leases had equal shares (Table 21, columns 3 and 4). 
Crop-share Cash and Livestock-share Leases 
Differences between the share of costs and share of returns affect 
resource combinations (particularly if the operator has the respon-
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Table 21. Percent Distribution of Selected Landlord Shares in Livestock-Share Leases, by Intervals of Difference Between Shares of 
Cost and Returns. 
Difference I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
between Share of firm Share fi xed Share of Share of Share of Share of Share o f Share o f 
p e rcent fi xed expenses lives tock ex penses return s costs exceed s li vestock fi xed crop fi xed crop costs 
sha res vs. finn vari able vs . vari a ble exceed s sh a re of expenses vs. expenses vs. li vestock vs. crop 
expenses vs . li ves tock ex penses share of r eturn fro m sh a re of vari a ble cro p exp enses vs . r eturns 
sh are of crop or vs . share of costs fo r li vestock livestock return expenses vari a ble 
li vesw ck return s livestock returns livestock li vestock 
ex pe nses 
Percent 
points + or - + or - + + + or - + or - + or - + or 
0- 5 15 14 33 25 63 8 22 44 
6- 15 50 46 17 14 31 19 45 43 
16- 25 24 25 2 2 4 25 17 10 
26+ 11 15 2 2 48 16 3 
100 100 52* 43* JOO JOO .100 100 
--
.., :> percent were equa l 
sibility for decision as to quanti ty of a var iable resource) or di stributio n 
of earnings in the fi rm . O f 89 opera tors who though t that fer tili zer 
application was inadequate, 28 replied that the cost sharing arrange-
men t was the reason for the de fi ciency. Also, 24 op erators said they 
would h ave u sed more weed spray if costs and returns h ad been shared 
th e same. W h ether combinations and o utpu t would actu ally have been 
ch anged significantly on the sample farms if there h ad been no restri c-
tions in leases and if shares of cos t h ad equ aled sh ares of re turns is 
a moot q uestion ; only opera tors were interviewed. Land lords would 
h ave opinions, too, which m ight differ from those of tenan ts. 
The evidence available shows that there were conditions in exist-
ing leases suffic ien t to cause differences between earning ratios for 
landlords and tenants. T he di fferences between shares of cost and 
retu rn , and between fixed and variable expenses, were of su ffic ien t 
size to cau se income transfers between parties in many leases, both 
crop-share an d livestock-share. In CSC leases, cash ren tal for h ay or 
pas ture can also cause income transfer. In these comparisons the value 
of rotation pasture was included in th e to tal value of crops b y ca l-
cul ating the equivalen t value of h ay; the land lord 's crop value included 
h is cash ren t from rotation pastu re. Calculated p roduction value of 
rota tion pasture u sually exceeded ren tal value-which accounts for 
part of the d ifferences between landlord and tenan t percen tages of 
cost and re turn s. R en tal paym en t less than production value per acre 
represents an incom e transfer to the ten an t. 
LS leases h ad 50-50 sh ares, p redominantly, for th e items shared. 
However , in the majority of fi rms, the tenan t's costs and also hi s re turns 
exceeded those of his landlord. (As noted earli er, th e mean differen ce 
in earning ratios was not signifi can t at th e 5 percent level). Thi s 
d iffere nce is explained largely by the sharing of fixed items of cost, 
wh ich is ach ieved by balancing on e fixed cos t b y one party against 
another fixed cost of the other party, in the cus tom ary pattern of th e 
community, wi th o u t going thro ugh th e addi tional step of calcula ting 
the values of these fixed i tems and balancing dollar values against each 
oth er. T h at is, fixed cos ts in the firm are actually sh ared in som e such 
proportion as 40-60 or 60-40, whereas all other shared cos ts are 
50-50, an d some costs are no t shared . 
T he results of tabula ting the percentage shares of costs and returns 
for landlords and tenants in 104 LS leases are as fo llows: 
1. Tenan t returns exceeded landlord re turns in 78 leases; land lord 
return s exceeded tenan t returns in 14 leases; and returns were equ al 
in 12 leases. 
2. Tenan t cos ts exceeded landlord cos ts in 87 leases; landlord costs 
exceeded tenan t costs in J 7 leases; and there was equali ty in n o leases. 
3. Tenan t returns and cos ts exceeded those o f the land lord in 66 
leases. L and lord returns and costs exceed those of tenan ts in 3 leases. 
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4. Tenant returns exceeded landlord returns bu t tenant costs were 
less than landlord costs in 12 leases. 
5. Tenant returns were less than landlord returns but tenant costs 
were greater than landlord costs in 11 leases. 
6. In 10 leases the returns were equal between par ties, but tenants 
had greater costs. 
7. In 2 leases returns were equal but landlord costs were larger. 
Thus, costs and returns are n ot equ al between parties in a majority 
of LS leases, in spite of the general practice of dividing the sh ared 
items of costs and of returns equally. This suggests, as is well explained 
and illustrated in ·w isconsin Agricul tural Research Bulletin 213, 
August, 1959, that more attention is needed on the determination of 
shares. Specifically, inequalities between parties can be removed by 
balancing the dollar values of fixed costs against each other, and 
shifting fixed costs between parties-for example, by sharing the costs 
of m achinery-to achieve a desired fractional share, and then have 
each party pay the same fraction al share of each variable cost as he 
does of firm fixed cost, and also receive that same fract ional share of 
returns in the firm. 
Amounts of Income Transfers Between Parties 
Data from the returns-costs ratios for CSC leases provide a basis 
for estimating the average income transfer per farm from crop pro-
duction. As shown in Table 15, the returns-costs ratio on a firm b asis 
averaged 107.4; for landlords it was 134. For all CSC leases landlords 
received an average of 44.1 percent of crop value and paid 39.6 percent 
of crop costs. If it is assumed that the landlords continue to receive 
44.1 percent of crop returns, but increase their percentage of crop 
costs to 44. 1 percent-which automatically changes their returns-costs 
ratio to 107.4 (equal to the firm ratio), tenan t income would be 
increased by an average of $3 15 per farm, and the tenants' r eturn-cost 
ratio also would become 107.423 
If the adjustment is made by reducing the landlord's share of 
crops to his present share of costs-which also equates earning ratios 
between firm, landlord and tenant- the average per farm is $403 more 
income for the tenant. 
On the same basis, transfers between parties are somewhat larger 
on the average for LS leases. If landlords paid the same percentage of 
costs as they received of returns, $6 15 more income would go to the 
tenant. If landlords received the same percentage of returns as they 
pay of costs, $773 more income would go to tenants, on the average. 
Another estimate of the extent of income transfers between parties 
can be m ade by assuming that the landlord's presen t share of fixed 
2
" It is noted that the results of income transfers from tenant to la ndlord through 
lease terms become capitalized in to land value in the long run . 
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costs is equated with his share of variable costs and with his share of 
returns. Exploratory analysis of 75 CSC leases (Iowa) indicates that 
there are substantial income transfers. Of the 75 farms, 21 had trans-
fers from tenant to landlord, and 54 from landlord to tenant. Equating 
the share of fixed cost with share of variable costs and share of returns 
increased landlord income an average of $1,111 per farm on 21 farms 
and decreased it an average of $798 on 54 farms. The amounts varied 
from a few dollars to almost $3,700 per farm. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
To summarize, farms in the three tenure groups studied differed 
as to size of business, combinations of inputs and outputs, selected 
characteristics of operators, and amount of expenditures on buildings. 
Although there were several indications that farms operated under 
LS leases made more efficient use of resources, and this mainly by 
using labor on larger acreages and more livestock, many of the d iffer-
ences between tenure groups decreased or disappeared when farms 
were sorted and compared on the basis of the same size of business 
as measured by total annual inputs. The findings agreed with those of 
previous studies. There are few differences between the general tenure 
forms as to efficiency of resource use. Tenant and 00 follow essen-
tially the same farming practices, for the same sizes of b usiness. I n 
part, the lack of significant d ifferences between groups operating 
under the three different tenure forms can be attributed to the wide 
variety of farm characteristics and arrangements within tenure groups. 
The lack of differences between the three general tenure forms 
should not be interpreted as indicating that tenure characteristics and 
arrangements are unimportant to individual operators or landlords. 
For example, study of earning ratios showed that wide differences 
exist between owner and tenant-operated farms; but even this range 
is statistically insignificant at a probability level of 5 percent. In essence, 
dollars invested in 00 farms earned the same rate of return (for the 
year 1957) as did those in tenant-operated uni ts. But the earnings 
ratios for landlords under CSC leases were significantly h igher than 
those of their tenants. The earning capacity of the individual farm is 
a function of quantities, qualities, and combinations of factors and 
products. Further, for leased farms the tenure arrangements including 
the shares of inputs and returns are matters for decision between the 
two parties; if the contracting parties conclude that one receives a 
higher rate of earning on the resources he furn ishes than the other, 
there will likely be changes made in the content of their lease. 
The selection of the tenure form is a decision which has to be 
made individually. Choice between owner-operation and tenancy, 
al though influenced by the personal goals, and by availability of 
capital and of farms to buy or rent, realistically is also influenced by 
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rela tive earning opportunities for limited q uantiti es of capital. For 
the farms in the sample, OOs had a higher net worth than did tenants, 
but from an incom e-earning opportunity viewpoint tenancy offered 
more advan tages for the investmen t of limi ted capital than d id small 
0 0 farms. 
Selection of the de tails of arrangement wi thin a given tenure form 
are also matters of individual choice. T here is evidence of income 
transfers between parties to leases; the evidence suggests enough d iffer-
ences within lease types as to details of sharing cos ts and returns to 
explain income transfers between parties. 
Net worth of OOs exceeded tha t of tenan ts. Net farm income on 
LS farms was significantly larger than that for CSC or 00 units 
(Table 2). Earning ratios on the larger farms operated under LS 
leases exceeded those of the same size farmed by OOs, and earning 
ratios fo r landlords were sign ifican tly larger than for tenants on CSC 
farms (Table 18). This evidence suggests that the marginal efficiency 
of capi tal, within the limits controlled by individ uals, is higher under 
tenancy than on 00 farms, a relation that has long been understood 
and apprecia ted. That is, the net worth of a CSC tenan t earns greater 
return s for him when invested in machinery and operat ing capital 
than if spread over all types of inpu ts as is requi red in a small 00 u n it. 
Cap ital assets of operators and landlords were not stud ied in detail. 
No ques tions were asked as to how these capital assets were accumu-
la ted. Obviously, however , the opportunity for accumula tion of n et 
worth is gr eater in a size of business that provides a flow of income 
which is larger than the average annual living costs of the family. 
This condition holds for bo th owner and tenant-opera ted farms. 
T he problems of capital accumula tion as related to form of tenure 
were beyond the scope of this study. I t can be noted, however, that 
OOs are older than tenants-and h ave h ad more time to accumula te 
capital from both farm earnings and inheritance. But i t must also be 
noted that opportunity for capital accumula tion on the farms in the 
sample-both tenant and 00- is much less than tha t implied by the 
average returns/ cost ra tios in T ables 15-18 or by the average n et 
farm income in Table 2. Cost of family living must be taken in to 
acount. Assuming tha t $4,000 per year is needed for family living, 
only 13 percent of the farms had firm returns minus firm costs large 
enough to permit capita l accumulation (14 percen t of OOs, 9 per-
cent CSC operators, and 16 percent of LS operators had net returns 
above $4,000). 
This study considered the shares and the items shared as reported 
by the farm operators. No questions were asked as to how these shares 
were determined. The evidence thus reports on what was practiced 
at the time of the survey. Information from other sources indica tes 
that parties to leases accept customary arrangements as to p ercentage 
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shares, i terns shared, and rates for cash rent on hay and pasture 
Differences between shares of products, shares of cost, and shares of 
return, and differences between earning ratios for firms, landlords, and 
tenants, resulted in income transfers between parties. Whether these 
differences existed through lack of awareness, or because the existing 
arrangements were better than the next best alternatives for the parties 
concerned, cannot be determined from the ev idence available. 
If owners are to receive the full earnings of the resources they con-
tribute to their farm businesses, they need to devote more attention 
to the determination of shares and the items shared. Further, if the 
resources are to earn at rates of which they are capable-that is, if 
incomes from resources are to be maximized-more attention needs to 
be given to resource combinations. This means that operators need 
to think more in terms of equating marginal returns between different 
uses. 
This study shows that many farms do not have optimum resource 
combinations. Labor and machinery for the acreages operated and the 
enterprises involved appear excessive. Thus, the resource mix on many 
farms might well be changed-in such simple form, for example, as 
cutting down on the machinery investment and using those funds for 
additional inputs of fertilizer or weed spray. Or, more land might 
be rented. Results of a study of alternative combinations under the 
same total capital, but contrasting farming practices and associated 
management, demonstrate that the resource combination can affect net 
income within a range of nearly four times. Linear programming of a 
240-acre farm with total capital constant, resulted in a net income 
3.7 times larger with improved techniques and above-average manage-
ment than with average practices and management. (Net is income 
defined as gross farm income minus variable costs, taxes, insurance, 
building repairs, depreciation on machinery and buildings.)25 It is 
recognized that changing the quality of management actually means 
a change in total inputs. 
Under current leasing arrangements there is little to encourage 
investments by landlords or tenants in buildings. Few leases contain 
provisions for cash rental on the dwelling, and few leases provide 
opportunity for return on investment in service buildings. Both land-
lords and tenants are often dissa ti sfied with this facet of the farm 
rental market; yet few depart from customary practice to solve the 
problem. Does this suggest that the problem is relatively unimportant? 
Or does it suggest tha t the alternative solutions are also unsatisfactory? 
'' Dwight Gadsby. The Economics of Farm Land Rent. Unpublished Master's
Thesis, Iowa State University, 1960. 
What;s the "Score" on Farm Rents? Iowa Farm Science, Sept.-Oct. , 1961 . 
,., Gerald Dean, Earl 0. H eady, and H . H. Yeh. An Analysis of Returns from 
Farm and Nonfarm Employment Opportunities on Shelby -Grundy-Haig Soils. 
Research Ru.1/etin 451 Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station , May 1957. p. 107. 
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Does the lack of compensation arrangements in leases imply that land-
lords and tenants are unaware of the consequences, or of the advantages 
of compensation for unexhausted improvements? 
Improvements to buildings on tenant-operated farms lag behind 
those on 00 units. Expenditures on service build ings and dwellings 
during the 5-year period 1953-57 were larger for OOs in the sample. 
Again, this is descriptive of current practice. The ava ilable informa tion 
does not explain why the conditions exist. Many tenants said that 
they wou ld have been willing to make more improvements if costs 
were shared and provisions were made for compensation at termination. 
One important implication for future research on tenure problems 
is that further refinements are needed to handle quality d ifferences 
in inputs. The study reported here attempted to hold quality of land 
equal between farms by limi ting coverage to one general soil type. 
Yet in the opinion of operators, value per acre-one measure of quality 
-varied in a range of more than five times the lowest value. 
Qu ality of both management and labor were in effect assumed as 
equ al between farms and tenures, and between parties to the leases. 
Labor was measured in terms of man weeks available. Future studies 
will need to account for variations in quality of these factors and 
other inputs in order to measure accurately the relative efficiencies of 
resource use under different tenures, or between farms of the same 
tenure type. One explanation of the inconclusive results of several of 
the tests for differences, among and within tenures, is in quality d iffer-
entials in inputs. 
Most factor and product prices must be taken as given in the 
market, but land, buildings, labor, and management in the firm are 
priced by decisions of operators; the buyer participates in the price 
determination. When the price paid to the owner of a resource-such 
as land, labor, and management-is a share of the products of the 
firm, there is reason to do something more than accept "customary 
shares" in the community. 
What do the findings in this study sugges t for adj ustments in 
form and structure of tenure, including content of leases? They are 
summarized as follows: 
1. The general tenure forms-owner-operatorship, CSC leases, an d 
LS leases- each serve an important purpose and provide opportunities 
for efficient farm organization when resources are available in sufficien t 
quantities. No changes are needed in the forms as such. Because of 
the impacts of capital limitation among individuals, the differing possi-
bilities of effective combina tions under the distinct lease forms, and 
the pressures of both technology and prices on farm enlargement, the 
relative proportions will change through time. Leasing is a means 
to farm enlargement. 
2. Farms in each tenure class suffer from capital limitations which 
affect improvement investments and use of output-increasing practices. 
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Another retarding factor is lack of knowledge of effects of practices 
such as weed spray, fertilizer and feeding additives. Expansion in size 
of business does not necessarily require more land per farm. But expan-
sion through intensification of both crop and livestock practices may 
require more credit. Capital may be self-rationed, in which case the 
solution depends on removing the reason for such rationing. If rationed 
by lenders the solution to credit problems probably lies outside of 
the farm tenure arrangements. 
3. For leased farms, both CSC and LS, percentage shares show 
little variation. Customary shares rule. Parties to leases stand to bene-
fit by determining the shares that fit their particular objectives and 
available capital. Fitting the percentage shares to the conditions of 
the proposed lease should remove the possibilities of income transfer 
between parties. 
4. Analysis via Cobb-Douglas production function showed that 
the marginal value product of land exceeded its opportunity cost in 
each of the three tenures; also, labor opportunity cost exceeded its 
marginal returns on owner and CSC farms (Table 14). Returns/ cost 
comparisons showed that landlords received higher returns on their 
inputs than did tenants (Tables 19 and 20). Inasmuch as real estate 
is usually the major input of the landlord, it is evident that the 
rental market allocated to land a return more favorable than that from 
other inputs. This fact has many implications as to the need for change 
in sharing of costs and returns between land owners and tenants. 
In addition, the evidence of excess labor and m achinery in rela-
tion to land, and of the need for changes in combinations of inputs 
for more efficient production, suggest that re-allocation of these factors 
between farms is a necessary adjustment, for both tenant and 00 farms. 
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APPENDIX A. 
The Sample 
The sample was drawn by Duane F. Neuman, graduate assistan t at 
the University of Nebraska and ·walter G. MilJer, Farm Economics 
Division, Economic R esearch Service, United States Department of 
Agriculture. Block area segments of four sections each were outlined 
and numbered on county highway maps of the study area. T his area 
is a relatively homogeneous section of the deep loess soils of: Northwest 
Missouri (Atchison, Nodaway, Holt, Andrew, and Buchanan Co unties); 
Southwest Iowa (Pottawattami, M ills, Montgomery, Fremont, and Page 
Counties); Southeast Nebraska (Lancaster, Cass, Otoe, Nemaha, and 
Richardson Counties); and Torthwest Kansas (Brown, Doniphan, 
Atchison, Leavenworth Counties). Sections with mainly bottomland 
and those with urban areas were excluded. 
All operators within the block of four sections were screened, by 
personal interview or from information given by neighbors, to pro-
vide approximately equal numbers of owner-operators, crop-share 
cash renters, and livestock-share renters. T h e screening resulted in 
listing of so few cash renters that this group was excluded. T he fol-
lowing types of operators were also excluded from the study: (a) h ired 
managers; (b) part owners; (c) partnerships; (d) owner-operators over 
54; (e) crop-share renters; (f) tenants with mixed leases; (g) full tenants 
who rented from their own or their wife's parents, grandparents, broth-
ers, sisters, uncles, or aunts; (h) owners or tenants who operated less 
than 70 acres; (i) those who operated land consisting of 25 percent or 
more of bottomland. 
APPENDIX B. 
The production functions (Cobb-Douglas) were of th e form 
bl b2 b 11 
Y = aX1 X2 .. .. X 11 or log Y = log a + b 1 log X 1 + . ... + bu log Xn-
For the crop function: 
Y = gross value crop production : grain and hay, rotation pasture, 
soil bank payments, and .8 of receipts from custom work done on other 
farms . 
X 1 = cropland in acres : h ay, grain, rotation pasture, soil bank. 
X 2 = labor in weeks: operator's crop labor, .75 of weeks of wife's 
and children 's crop labor, hired crop labor, and weeks of custom labor. 
X3 = crop machine services : .26 of estimated value of crop 
machinery fuel, o il, machinery repair, and .8 of custom hire of 
machinery. 
X4 = miscellaneous crop expense: fert ilizer and lime on cropland, 
farm-produced grains used for seed, plants, seed treatment, crop-build-
ing repairs, crop share of farm electricity, and other miscellaneous. 
For the livestock function : 
Y = total livestock production: sales less p urchases, home-used live-
stock and products, and change in inventory. 
X 1 = beginning inventory plus ending inven tory livestock divided 
by 2. 
X 2 = livestock labor, weeks: operator labor, .75 of weeks of wife's 
and children's livestock labor, and hired labor. 
X3 = livestock building and equipment investment: estimated value. 
X 4 = feeds fed: value of rotation and permanent pasture, farm-
produ ced feeds fed, and commercial feeds. 
X 5 = miscellaneous: veterinary expense, breeding feeds, livestock 
building repairs, livestock fuel, oil and equipment r epairs, electricity, 
and other cash expense. 
Number of Usable Schedules by T enure Class and State. 
T enure class 
I Missouri 
N umber of sched ules 
Iowa Nebraska Kansas Total 
Owner-operators 55 67 29 9 160 
Crop-share cash renters 25 77 65 4 171 
Livestock-share renters 23 57 20 4 104 
Totals 103 201 ll4 17 435 

